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Expectancy for upcoming action requirements is a funda-
mental prerequisite for human control of action (Gilbert 
& Wilson, 2007). This expectancy is almost always tem-
porally specific (Thomaschke, Wagener, Kiesel, & 
Hoffmann, 2011b). Different events are expected at dif-
ferent points in time. For example, when pressing a cof-
fee vending machine’s “Americano” button, I expect, 
because of my experience with the machine, that I will 
need to put my cup under the coffee nozzle after an 
interval of 2 to 3 s. But if the interval after pressing the 
button appears to last approximately 10 s instead, I 
expect another event: I now expect an error message 
asking me to insert cash.
The temporal specificity of these expectancies is usu-
ally evidenced by suboptimal performance when 
expected events appear at atypical moments. Performance 
would be impaired if, because of a malfunction of the 
machine, the coffee nozzle spouted after the time the 
machine typically took to display an error message (i.e., 
10 s) or if the error message appeared at the time when 
the coffee was expected to be dispensed (i.e., 2–3 s; see 
Thomaschke, Wagener, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2011a; 
Wagener & Hoffmann, 2010). The expectancy described 
in this example has been termed specific temporal expec-
tancy (Thomaschke, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2011). Specific 
temporal expectancy can be defined as expectancy for a 
combination of an event and a point in time. An event is 
not expected per se, but is expected conditional on a 
point in time.
Specific temporal expectancy is prevalent in all areas 
of human behavior in which the duration of intervals is 
predictive about an event. The duration of pauses in oral 
speech, for example, affects listeners’ expectancy about 
the complexity of the expressions that follow (Watanabe, 
Hirose, Den, & Minematsu, 2008). Likewise, delay lengths 
in human-computer interaction are often predictive about 
the computer’s response, and users adapt to these regu-
larities. For example, people’s optimism that a Web page 
will load successfully decreases continuously after they 
navigate to the URL until it eventually changes to the 
expectation of an error message (Seow, 2008).
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Abstract
Expectancy for upcoming action requirements is a fundamental prerequisite for human control of action. In the 
research reported here, we investigated which part of cognitive processing benefits from temporal predictability. In a 
binary forced-choice paradigm, visual targets were preceded by different intervals. In one condition, targets could be 
predicted by the length of the intervals. In other conditions, response goals or response effectors could be predicted by 
the length of the intervals. Behavioral advantages were observed when response effectors were temporally predictable, 
whereas temporal predictability of response goals and target stimuli was not sufficient. The findings thus show that 
temporal expectancy in speeded choice-reaction tasks facilitates late, effector-specific motor processing. These findings 
are of importance not only for our basic understanding of action control but also for any human-machine interaction 
that involves system delays.
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Despite its prevalence in everyday life and its impor-
tance for goal-directed adaptive behavior, little is known 
about the underlying cognitive mechanisms of event- 
specific temporal expectancy. Previous research on tem-
poral cognition has focused mainly on general temporal 
expectancy, that is, adaptation to intervals that are not 
informative about specific events ( Jepma, Wagenmakers, 
& Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Lewis & Miall, 2009; Los & Schut, 
2008).
An important question, pivotal to the further under-
standing of specific temporal expectancy, regards the 
cognitive locus of its influence: Which aspects of cogni-
tive processing actually benefit from temporal predict-
ability of events? Is it a certain stimulus that is expected 
after a certain interval, in the sense that the perceptual 
system processes stimuli more efficiently when they 
occur after their characteristic intervals? Or is it prepara-
tion of the response that benefits from specific temporal 
predictability? The latter option can be subdivided fur-
ther. Most theories of motor control differentiate between 
the processing of distal action goals (e.g., choosing which 
nozzle to place the cup under) and the processing of 
motor programs to achieve these goals (e.g., moving the 
hand holding the cup; see Thomaschke, Hopkins, & 
Miall, 2012). Both aspects of response processing might 
benefit from specific temporal expectancy.
To decide between these three alternative hypotheses 
(that specific temporal expectancy facilitates perception, 
that it facilitates action-goal processing, and that it facili-
tates movement processing), we devised a binary forced-
choice paradigm involving two target stimuli, four 
response buttons, and two modes of operating these but-
tons. The response buttons were grouped into two sets, 
one on the left and the other on the right, each consisting 
of an upper and a lower button. For one target, it was 
imperative to press an upper button; for the other target, 
participants had to press a lower button (see Fig. 1). 
Participants were instructed to alternate between the left 
set and the right set from trial to trial throughout the 
experiment. One group of participants operated button 
sets by switching hands and having four fingers (two fin-
gers on each hand) resting on the buttons throughout the 
experiment (the bimanual group, see Fig. 2a). Another 
group operated both button sets with the same hand, 
moving it back and forth between the sets from trial to 
trial (the unimanual group; see Fig. 2b).
Each target was preceded by one of two possible 
intervals. Targets were temporally predictable: Overall, 
one of the targets appeared after one of the intervals with 
a probability of .7, whereas the other target appeared 
after the other interval with the same probability. Critically, 
this correlation between target and interval was realized 
with only one of the response sets, the correlated set. 
When participants used this set, targets were preceded by 
their characteristic interval with a probability of .9, 
whereas they were preceded unpredictably by both 
intervals with a probability of .5 for the uncorrelated set 
(see Fig. 1).
This arrangement allowed us to test whether specific 
temporal expectancy was specific to targets (perceptual 
expectancy), to response keys (action-goal expectancy), 
or to fingers (motor expectancy). On the basis of previ-
ous studies on temporal expectancy (Sanders, 1966; Zahn 
& Rosenthal, 1966), we assumed that temporal predict-
ability of an event could directly induce temporal expec-
tancy for that event. This means that when a cognitive 
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Fig. 1. Arrangement of button sets and frequencies of interval-button combinations. When the “&” 
symbol appeared, it was imperative to press the upper button of the current set; when the “#” symbol 
appeared, it was imperative to press the lower button of the current set. Participants alternated between 
correlated and uncorrelated button sets from trial to trial. The four timelines illustrate the temporal prob-
abilities separately for the four buttons. For the correlated button set, the interval predicted the identity of 
the upcoming symbol, and hence the required button, with 90% probability. For the uncorrelated button 
set, the interval was not predictive of the identity of the upcoming symbol. Note that in the experiment, 
the symbols appeared only on the screen (not on the buttons themselves). t = time.
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event (e.g., processing a stimulus or pressing a button 
with one’s finger) occurs frequently after a certain inter-
val, specific temporal expectancy should lead to shorter 
responses for that event after its typical, relative to its 
atypical, interval.
If temporal predictability facilitates target perception, 
a temporal-expectancy effect (i.e., faster responses for 
frequent combinations of interval and target than for 
infrequent combinations) should be observable irrespec-
tive of response set and response fingers. If, on the 
contrary, specific temporal expectancy facilitates the pro-
cessing of action goals (i.e., of the selection of a particu-
lar response key), this effect should be restricted to the 
correlated button set (irrespective of the fingers used to 
operate the sets) because only response keys from that 
set are temporally predictable. If temporal expectancy is 
specific to individual fingers, then a temporal-expectancy 
effect would be restricted to those fingers that operate 
the correlated button set—that is, expectancy effects in 
this case should emerge in the unimanual group irrespec-
tive of the button set but should emerge in the bimanual 
group only for the fingers used to operate the correlated 
button set. Note that our hypotheses did not rely on par-
ticipants’ consciously detecting any interval-event regu-
larities, because previous studies on the phenomenon 
have suggested that one adapts to interval-event frequen-
cies in an implicit, nonconscious way (Thomaschke et al., 
2011a, 2011b; Wagener & Hoffmann, 2010).
Method
Participants (26 female, 5 male; mean age = 22.94 years, 
SD = 2.82) were allocated randomly to two experimental 
groups. All participants performed a speeded binary-
choice task, responding with four response buttons to 
two target symbols (the “&” symbol and the “#” symbol), 
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Fig. 2. Hand arrangements and results for the (a) bimanual and (b) unimanual groups. The illustrations show how participants in the 
two groups operated button sets with either two hands or one hand. The graphs show mean response times (RTs) as a function of 
button set and frequency of interval-target combination. Overlap of the confidence intervals represented by the error bars is equiva-
lent to nonsignificance in a t test with an alpha level of .05 (Tryon, 2001). Cohen’s d is standardized by difference scores (Gibbons, 
Hedeker, & Davis, 1993) and refers to set-wise comparisons between frequent and infrequent interval-target combinations.
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which appeared in random order. The four buttons were 
arranged in a square to form two response sets, one on 
the left and one on the right. Participants were instructed 
to switch between button sets after each trial throughout 
the experiment (see Fig. 2). One of the symbols was 
mapped to the upper buttons, and the other symbol was 
mapped to the lower buttons. This mapping was counter-
balanced between participants. Participants operated the 
upper and lower buttons using their middle and index 
fingers, respectively. One group operated both sets with 
two hands so that their fingers remained on the same 
buttons throughout the experiment (bimanual group, n = 
15). The other group operated both button sets with their 
dominant hand so that the response hand moved from 
one set to the other between trials (unimanual group, 
n = 16).1
Target stimuli were preceded by one of two intervals 
(600 ms or 1,800 ms) during which a fixation cross was 
presented. When the correlated button set was used, one 
of the targets was preceded by the short interval in 90% 
of its occurrences, and the other target was preceded by 
the long interval in 90% of its occurrences. When the 
uncorrelated button set was used, both targets appeared 
equally often after both intervals. This procedure had the 
effect that each target was preceded by its typical interval 
in 70% of its occurrences. The experiment consisted of 
four blocks of 160 trials each. The experiment was pre-
ceded by a training phase, also consisting of four blocks, 
on the day before the main experiment.2 After the experi-
ment, participants were asked whether they detected any 
regularity during the experiment.
Results
A mixed-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was con-
ducted with the between-subjects factor group (bimanual 
vs. unimanual), the within-subjects factors button set 
(correlated vs. uncorrelated) and frequency of interval-
target combinations (frequent vs. infrequent), and the 
dependent variable response time. The main effect for 
frequency of interval-target combinations was significant, 
F(1, 29) = 35.143, p < .05, as was the interaction between 
button set and frequency of combination, F(1, 29) = 
7.752, p < .05. Most important, the three-way interaction 
also was significant, F(1, 29) = 4.355, p < .05. To further 
qualify this interaction, two separate repeated measures 
ANOVAs were then conducted for both groups. The main 
effect for frequency was significant in the bimanual 
group, F(1, 14) = 14.17, p = .002, and in the unimanual 
group, F(1, 14) = 22.17, p < .001. More important, button 
set and frequency of interval-target combination inter-
acted in the bimanual group, F(1, 14) = 10.184, p < .05, 
but not in the unimanual group, F(1, 15) = 0.286, n.s. (see 
Fig. 2). In an analogous ANOVA for error rates, no main 
effect or interaction was significant (all ps > .110). Note 
that participants responded faster overall in the uniman-
ual group than in the bimanual group, probably because 
of the additional time needed to switch between hands in 
the bimanual condition (Rabbitt, 1978). According to 
Rabbitt (1978), this additional time might be related to 
the involvement of the nondominant hand in the biman-
ual condition. In a postexperimental interview, none of 
the participants reported being aware of the correlation 
between intervals and targets.
Discussion
Our results show that specific temporal expectancy for 
stimulus-response events is tied to individual effectors (in 
our experiment, fingers). When participants operated 
temporally predictable and temporally unpredictable 
keys with different fingers, temporal-expectancy effects 
were restricted to the fingers used to operate predictable 
keys. When participants operated those sets of keys with 
the same fingers, temporal expectancy effects were 
observed for both the temporally predictable and the 
temporally unpredictable keys. This effector specificity of 
temporal expectancy clearly excludes an explanation in 
terms of perceptual expectancy, because such an account 
would predict temporal-expectancy effects for any fre-
quent interval-target combination, independent of 
response keys and response fingers. Thus, we conclude 
that specific temporal expectancy affects postperceptual 
processing stages.
The results also speak against temporal-predictability 
effects on action-goal processing. The temporal predict-
ability of action goals was identical in both groups (i.e., 
only the correlated button set was predictable), but spe-
cific temporal-expectancy effects were clearly different 
between groups. Thus, the difference in expectancy must 
have been related to the processing of action features 
other than action goals.
One might speculate, however, that because of the dif-
ferent movement demands in both groups, participants’ 
awareness of the interval-signal regularities differed, 
which would explain the performance difference between 
groups. The requirement to switch between hands in the 
bimanual group might have made participants more 
aware of the difference between button sets. Consequently, 
they might have altered their mode of adaptation into a 
more precise, fine-grained state, which in turn allowed 
button-set-specific adaptation to interval-event regulari-
ties in that group. However, for several reasons, we 
regard such an explanation as less plausible than our 
interpretation. First, we do not assume that temporal 
adaptation, a basic, ubiquitous, and evolutionarily impor-
tant mechanism, is tightly connected to explicit detection 
of temporal regularities. Second, participants in both 
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groups (unimanual and bimanual) uniformly reported 
not having detected any interval-signal regularities. Third, 
our explanation relies on only one assumption: Temporal 
predictability of a finger movement leads to temporal 
expectancy for that finger movement (independent of 
awareness of regularity). Thus, our interpretation is more 
parsimonious than an alternative explanation based on 
temporal-pattern discrimination by hand switch.
Consequently, we favor an explanation in terms of 
temporal expectancy of finger movements. With regard to 
the coffee-machine example from the introduction, our 
explanation means that it is the particular hand movement 
(of the cup-holding hand) that is temporally scheduled to 
the machine’s typical response interval, not the choice of 
the appropriate nozzle to place the cup under and not the 
visual detection of the coffee spouting.
These conclusions are in line with similar results from 
the literature on nontemporal event expectancy. Precuing 
a stimulus-response event has been shown to facilitate 
mainly motor preparation (Leuthold & Jentzsch, 2011; 
Leuthold, Sommer, & Ulrich, 1996; Rosenbaum, 1980). In 
our study, the length of the interval might be seen as a 
temporal instance of a precue, scheduling specific motor 
preparation to certain points in time. Note, however, that 
we do not mean to exclude any specific temporal expec-
tancy for cognitive processes other than late, effector-
specific response processing. In other contexts, for 
instance, in which target stimuli are difficult to discrimi-
nate, specific temporal expectancy might also facilitate 
perception (for examples of general temporal expectancy 
for stimuli, see Bueti, Bahrami, Walsh, & Rees, 2010; 
Ghose & Maunsell, 2002; Kingstone, 1992; Lange, Rösler, 
& Röder, 2003; Rolke, 2008; Seibold, Bausenhart, Rolke, 
& Ulrich, 2011).
In summary, our findings show that specific temporal 
expectancy in speeded choice-reaction tasks facilitates 
late, effector-specific motor processing, a finding that is 
of importance not only for our basic understanding of 
action control but also for any human-machine interac-
tion that involves system delays.
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Notes
1. To avoid carryover effects with regard to correlation learning 
between conditions, each group was tested in only one of the 
conditions (unimanual or bimanual).
2. A training session was held because pilot studies have shown 
that the combination of button-set alternation and speeded 
choice response is difficult to learn. Data from the practice 
session were analyzed for explorative reasons. As would be 
expected from the complicated setup of the experiment, these 
practice data revealed no consistent pattern with regard to 
adaptation to the temporal regularities. We assumed that, in 
particular, the switch of the button sets between trials, which 
had to be paced by the participants, needed to be practiced 
more extensively. Obviously, participants needed to have 
acquired the ability to perform the task fluently and properly 
before they could adapt to the temporal regularities that were 
of interest to us. That the practice session was on the day before 
the main experiment opens the possibility that consolidation 
processes were involved here (Debas et al., 2010; Lewis, Couch, 
& Walker, 2011). These processes, however, were not the focus 
of our study.
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